• Hello Guest

    Please bear with us! The Orange Room is being restructured.

How does muslim youth become radical

Mighty Goat

Legendary Member
Orange Room Supporter
#1
Online radicalization of Muslim moderate youth is a process normally instigated and organized by Christian and Zionist extremist entities operating online. The objective of such radicalization is to construct a confessional conflict between people who would only see their identity religiously. How does radicalization take place?
Have you been a victim of radicalization by extremist Christian and Zionist intelligence operating online? and what should you know before you change yourself from being a moderate secular into a radical Muslim?
I am posting articles for your info in the following posts, and would like to discuss with members on the Forum especially Muslims how does imbalanced moderation of their posts impacts their feelings towards Christians and Jews? How does such alienation make them feel about Islam and how does it modify their identity?
 
Last edited:
  • Advertisement
  • Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #2
    Radicalization


    The process of radicalization, including social, ideological and purpose conversion, is something that is of great concern in times when radicals take extreme action. Here are some notes on how a person may become radicalized. They may be remembered by the acronym 'TORA'.
    Transgression
    The process of radicalization often starts with with some form of transgression by the other side, breaking rules that the person's side holds as very important.
    Mistreatment
    A common transgressing action is mistreatment, typically by the authorities or military personnel using methods that cause extreme physical pain or mental distress. The mistreatment may be of the person who hence becomes radicalized, but often it is other people who are lionized as heroes or martyrs.
    For example, extreme methods of interrogationof suspects in Northern Ireland in the 1970s led to them becoming radicalized and their story leading to many others taking a strong position. More recently Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are clear candidates.
    Mistreatment can be historical and reasons for radicalization can go back generations. Past wars, massacres, persecutions and so on can fester for hundreds of years.
    Mistreatments today such as rape and child abuse are also extreme transgressions that effectively radicalize those who would severely punish the perpetrators. Many of us who think we would never be radicalized still hold extreme views on such topics.
    Immorality
    If there is no direct mistreatment then the inherent badness of the other side may be inferred from their transgression of an inviolable law or value.
    They may say things or take actions which are shocking and unthinkable, thereby proving their unworthiness. They may have betrayed a trust, defiled a holy object, conducted black rituals, blasphemed or otherwise shown a terrible lack of respect for people or social rules.
    Religion has been a source of radicalized conflict for many centuries.
    Organization
    A radical needs a movement, a cause. At some point, the outrage at the transgression is converted into organization for consequent action.
    Outrage
    A critical response to transgression is that some people at least are outraged or feel such a strong sense of betrayal to the extent that they seek justice, typically the extreme vengeance of retributive justice that lies outside national laws. This may be because the laws are seen as inadequate or because they represent governments who are the target of the outrage.
    Core
    At some point, a core organization is set up to drive the ideals and action. This typically happens in two ways. One is where an individual leader starts alone. Secondly, the core may arise more spontaneously as concerned individuals find one another.
    People in the core (often a single leader) may write or use a critical text or otherwise use charismatic oration to establish the central message.
    Cores can also be diffused, for example where they are based on central texts which are interpreted and acted upon in localized core organizations.
    Focus
    After initial development of the core message and core group, the organization starts to develop. This may be done formally or remain relatively informal. Key parts of this are in promoting the message, recruiting new people and driving action.
    This focus leads to a need for more people to spread the message and take action. The purpose of the core is then to sustain the focus and drive the rest of the organization.
    The organization may be strictly hierarchical, but it may also be very diffuse, with independent cells adopting the ideals and acting on their own.
    Evolution
    While the organization may start with a relatively peaceful principle, at some point it evolves or divides such that the viewpoint intensifies to the point of concluding that talk is not enough and action is needed. At first this may involve activist activities such as public rallies. Eventually, it can easily spill over into the view that violence is needed.
    When organizations divide, they may oppose one another and can self-destruct, which is one reason why a number of extreme groups never have much real effect. They may also become symbiotic, for example where the non-violent arm does not directly oppose the violent arm, and can in effect act as a step on the way towards the radically violent group.
    Recruitment
    When the transgression leads to some people seeking revenge then they may seek to organize in some way, recruiting and converting others to the cause.
    Rallying
    The call to arms goes through many channels, typically targeting groups where members may already feel the sense of injustice, such as minority religions, the unemployed, low-status people and so on. Other vulnerable people may well also be targeted. Peaceful groups with similar basic beliefs are often a key source of recruits.
    Communication may include preaching, emails posters, one-to-one calls and so on. While these do not radicalize alone, they often take the first step in communicating urgency or outrage. Later, the volume and intensity of messages create enough tension to trigger action.
    Initial communication may be subtle and seemingly about other subjects. Religions can be like this, first creating a desirable place, selling friendship and salvation before radical action.
    Sooner or later, the subject of discussion turns to the basic transgression, including the mistreatment or immorality and the consequent sense of outrage. This creates anger and a desire for action.
    Polarization
    A key part of the message is to demonize the other side, dehumanizing and objectifying the 'enemy' as less than human. In this way, valuesabout not harming others can be bypassed as they become 'things' that can be safely harmed or killed without any guilt about breaking social or personal rules.
    In this, polarization typically uses forms of amplification, negative stereotypes and simplified schema. By showing that the other side is so extreme and unreasonable, the simple conclusion is reached that the proposed response of extreme action is the only possible route forward. The arguments used may well be full of fallacies but the passion and underlying messages are clear.
    Polarization also creates excitement, converting what could be seen as mundane to something more arousing and thrilling.
    Socialization
    A critical part of radicalization is often in the way the message is socialized, becoming a central part of everyday conversation outside of the rallying call.
    Extreme groups often work in local 'cells' that encourage a them and us perception. These are relatively autonomous while sharing the broad polarized message of outrage an extreme action. One reason for this structure is so members related closely with one another as much as the overall cause. Like regular soldiers, their close personal connection with one another keeps them focused and committed.
    For socialization to work best, this conversation should be contained, with any contrary messages being kept at bay. Where possible, the people will be isolated to insulate them from external dissuasion. Where this is not possible,inoculation may be used to help them ward off other views.
    Groupthink, risky shift and other social means of ensuring conformance and normalizing extreme measures may also be used to keep people on track.
    Socialization also helps give meaning to what may otherwise be a dull life, to the point where people will become ready to sacrifice themselves for the greater good.
    Normalization
    The actions that may required are normalized, for example by repeat showing of videos of extreme violence, talking about examples of actual events and getting the target person to approve of and commit increasingly radical acts.
    Any doubt is jumped on quickly, with the person made to feel guilty or threatened with punishment or ostracization. Aggression may be used to frighten them into conformance. Softer methods may also be used but which subtly coerce their thinking.
    Action
    At some point, the need for action is raised and the radicalized person moved towards proving their passion.
    Requirement
    The need to act and the required action may appear through the direction of a group leader, though it may also emerge via less structured groups talking about what they might do. Action can range from protest to acts of terrorism and may start small and escalate either with success or frustration at limited success.
    A way that commitment is built is withsequential requests, such as Foot In The Door (FITD), where small initial requests that are easy to comply with are later followed up with larger requests.
    When there is a religious background then scriptures that can be interpreted as requiring or permitting violent action will act as a mandate or at least not inhibit extreme responses to what may be seen as heretical action.
    Promise
    Fulfilling the requirement is often linked to a promise of glory, from the admiration of peers to a guaranteed place in heaven.
    People who have already taken such action are held up as heroes. They and their actions are glorified and the radicalized people made to feel almost in that state of being deeply admired by many. All that is needed is heroic action.
    This in particular works with with people who are seeking meaning in life and who are feeling ignored and irrelevant. 'At last I can make a difference' is a common thought.
    Preparation
    Preparation for action is also a part of the radicalization process, as it sets the person on a road that is easy to start and increasingly difficult to back out of. This is particularly true when the person is working with others towards joint action. This may involve simulation, practice and continued indoctrination.
    See also
    Radicalization
     

    Iron Maiden

    Her Royal Brincess
    Staff member
    #3
    Online radicalization of Muslim moderate youth is a process normally instigated and organized by Christian and Zionist extremist and organized entities operating online.
    The objective of such radicalization is to construct a confessional conflict between people who would only see their identity religiously.
    Any proof?
    How does radicalization take place?
    Great idea to discuss, how does an average suddenly switch from his daily life to wabting to behead mecreants?
    Have you been a victim of radicalization by extremist Christian and Zionist intelligence operating online?
    How would one know such a thing??

    and what should you know before you change yourself from being a moderate secular into a radical Muslim?
    What do you mean by that, is it like a buzzfeed 10 things you should know before killing your porc eating neighbor?

    I am posting articles for yout info in the following posts, and would like to discuss with members on the Forum especially Muslims how does imbalanced moderation of their posts impacts their feelings towards Christians and Jews? How does such alienation make them feel about Islam and how does it modify their identity?
    Why did u omit atheists from your premise?
    We are 4 atheists mods here, so we feel quite shunned by your comments, especially @Nasser who lives only to alienate people on the forum.
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #5
    I personally was targeted by extremists Zionists on Israeli pages on Facebook. These people presumed that I was a Muslim because of my Arabic name. Maybe they thought I was Palestinian.
    The first thing that they would do is spam you with images insulting Muslims.
    Then they would report posts to Facebook to block the account.
    This is even if posts were not agressive or offensive in anyway.
    Several Zionists will then make a pact to accuse you of hate speech so that your account is closed by Facebook.
    But Facebook always brought my account back and punished me for only a week for doing nothing. They also evaluate my posts based on the false reports
     

    Isabella

    The Queen Of "Bazella"
    Orange Room Supporter
    #6
    So let me get this straight, first the Armenians escaping genocide have somehow oppressed all the good people of bourj hammoud and made them move elsewhere, and now Christians and Jews are the ones radicalising Muslims??

    I think you need to call your psychiatrist, your meds must be off balance or something, you seem to be severely hallucinating again !
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #7
    By reading the quran.
    Can we consider this type of accusation as part of the radicalization process.
    Creating a link between reading the Quran and terrorism defacto creates a confessional conflict as here we have an assertion that reading the Quran makes people radical, when the accusation itself triggers the process of transformation.
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #8
    So let me get this straight, first the Armenians escaping genocide have somehow oppressed all the good people of bourj hammoud and made them move elsewhere, and now Christians and Jews are the ones radicalising Muslims??

    I think you need to call your psychiatrist, your meds must be off balance or something, you seem to be severely hallucinating again !



    Radicalization is Extreme Propaganda
    Radicalization is the process of causing someone to adopt fanatic, radical positions on political or social issues through propaganda and thought reform.

    Radicalization - Exploitative Techniques

    Grievances Lead to Radicalization
    It is a mistake to think that radicalization applies only to Islamist terrorists, just as it is a mistake to believe that suicide bombings all have a religious motivation – there are many terrorist groups driven by purely political objectives.

    There are pathways that lead to radicalization, beginning with a personal grievance – for instance, the Chechnyan “black widows”, suicide bombers who had lost their husbands. Muslims who have been slighted for their belief also fulfill this criterion: anti-Muslim prejudice makes radicalization all the more likely.

    The first step may also be group grievance, where a group feels under attack – all separatist terrorists have experienced this. Kurds may support the PKK, because of attacks upon their fellow Kurds. In cultures that are under siege, there is no need for radicalizing thought reform techniques. The realities of daily life are enough. For instance, Tamils in Sri Lanka were denied the right to vote, so some joined the Tamil Tigers and became terrorists. Nothing can justify terrorism, but we need to work for a more fair, equitable world if we are to stop radicalization.

    Romantic and family attachments can also influence radicalization. Some groups originate as extensions of family or friend networks, and a pretty face can be used to recruit just as easily as into a cult.

    Cultural Isolation
    In the West, second generation offspring of Muslim parents often feel isolated from their roots and are prey to radical groups that apply thought reform techniques to instill new beliefs and behaviors. Sometimes they are rebelling against their parents’ moderate beliefs.

    The “slippery slope” addresses gradual radicalization through retreat into a like-minded group and withdrawal from the larger society. Resentment is amplified slowly, and the recruit is encouraged to bond with fellow-believers while disparaging outsiders. This may begin with something as laudable as charity towards the victims of prejudice but can escalate into “dispensing of existence”, where outsiders are perceived as demonic and evil, without human rights.

    Status is achieved by participation in the cause. Killing an enemy in war is viewed differently from murder in almost all societies. Killing an enemy is praiseworthy, and increases the status of the perpetrator. Risk-taking becomes a positive activity in a radical group. In groups that perform suicide bombing, a high status attaches to successful bombers and their surviving families. In some parts of the world, billboards have shown images of smiling “shahida” or “martyrs”.

    Existing concerns and beliefs are put aside for transformation as a member of the group, which, in effect, becomes a larger self – a set of values to be defended at all costs. “Unfreezing” of existing beliefs leads to changing of beliefs and then the “refreezing” process, where the new concerns and beliefs become central to a new sense of being and purpose.

    Belonging to a group often means accepting all of the values of the group, whether they are understood or not. Recruits submit to the higher authority of the leader or doctrine and demand purity – compliance with that authority.

    Polarization will happen, once group values have been accepted: you are either with us, or against us. There is no longer any middle ground. Those who disagree are the enemy. This argument is used to justify the murder of “enemy” children.

    Isolation strengthens the bond to the group in line with Hassan’s BITE model – control of behavior, information, thought and emotion will take place as an aspect of separation from the society beyond the group. Access to conflicting information is completely cut off: the media is under the control of hostile forces, anyone who disagrees with the leader is diabolic. Thought-stopping will prevent true believers from even listening to criticism.

    Provoking Competition
    Competition can also escalate into radicalization. This is seen in left-wing groups that compete to show that their doctrine is more pure than that of rival groups.

    Ju-jitsu politics indicates the use of provocation to make governments act against minorities and create oppressive legislation that will ultimately strengthen the radicals’ cause. This strategy is aimed at isolating moderates to cause social polarization. Al-Qaeda wanted First World countries to invade Muslim countries, to support their effort to create a united opposition. Their numbers grew from less than 500 at the time of 9/11, into tens of thousands after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. They want westerners to believe that all Muslims are militant Wahhabis and persecute them, so that there are even more persecuted Muslims, now eager to join the cause.

    An “Us and Them” mentality is fundamental to all cults; it is essential to terrorist groups. Opponents are seen as demons or even vermin – just as in genocides.

    It is Not a Mental Illness

    Extensive investigation has shown that terrorists do not suffer from mental illness. Ariel Merari has provided a significant survey of the psychology of suicide bombers in the Israel-Palestine conflict. He did find a higher proportion that is usual of dependent and avoidant personality types, but suicide bombers in Palestine come from a community that needs no radicalization. His book “Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism” gives a lot more detail.

    In contrast, western terrorist recruits are often from moderate Muslim families and have a university education. They have fairly normal personality profiles. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate in his book “Understanding Terror Networks“.

    Some experts prefer to avoid any suggestion of thought reform, but fail to explain what they mean by “radicalization”, which most certainly contains elements of manipulation and the use of undue influence.

    It is important that psychological and social research into terrorism continues. It is equally important that real grievances are addressed. At Open Minds, we want to teach students to understand the methods used to induce fervor and devotion by life-destroying cults of every type.

    Radicalization
     
    Last edited:

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #9
    National Institute of Justice
    How Radicalization to Terrorism Occurs in the
    United States: What Research Sponsored by the
    National Institute of Justice Tells Us
     

    Attachments

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #10
    It is scientifically proven that isolation and discrimination are significant factors which lead to organized radicalization. Quote from the study above:

    The NYPD outlined a four-stage process
    of radicalization (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).
    The first stage, “pre-radicalization,” is the
    period before any radicalization occurs.
    At this point, individuals have not been
    exposed to an extremist belief system
    and lead relatively normal lives, although
    there may be aspects of their experiences
    and environments (e.g., isolation,
    discrimination) that potentially make
    them more vulnerable to radicalization.
    The second stage, “self-identification,”
    involves individuals’ introduction to
    and eventual embrace of an extremist...p 4
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #11
    ARTICLES





    Religious Indoctrination or Marginalization Theory? Muslim-Christian Public Discourses and Perceptions on Religious Violence in Kenya





    Hassan J. Ndzovu

    Department of Philosophy, Religion and Theology Moi University Eldoret, Kenya. [email protected]





    ABSTRACT

    The numerous killings of non-Muslims by Muslim jihadi groups in Kenya, have fuelled ethno-religious tensions manifested in hatred and anger against the entire Muslim community. Though anti-jihadi Muslims have rightly condemned the targeting of their non-Muslim countrymen by the jihadists, the Christian leaders have not been satisfied by their counterpart's internal self- criticism. There are suspicions from Christians, even when anti-jihadi Muslims disassociate themselves from the heinous criminal acts of the jihadists, that all Muslims are the same, and posing a threat to peace in the country. In this context, there has arisen two theories of why we do have jihadist Islam in Kenya, and, for that matter, in other parts of the world. The one argument is that it is due to the social and economic marginalisation and exclusion of Muslims from the dominant and governing hegemony of the mainly Christian-affiliated parties in the country. This causes discontent and dissatisfaction among Muslims, especially among the poor and underprivileged, with the result of their radicalisation, attraction and exposure to, the jihadi groups. The other argument, and this coming from the Christian side, is that Muslims are not the only ones economically marginalized in the country. For them, one of the main factors for the radicalisation of some Muslims and their joining of jihadi groups, is the indoctrination by charismatic Muslim leaders (imams). Foregrounding the potency of both these accounts for explaining why some Muslims join the jihadi movement, as well as why we have jihadi violence (especially against Christians in Kenya), this article addresses these two theories and attempts to point to a Muslim-Christian Public Discourses and Perceptions, on Religious Violence way forward. It shall also address the issue of public rhetoric emanating from Christian religious leaders, against Muslims.

    Keywords: Jihadi, Muslims, Christians, marginalization, radicalization, Kenya





    Introduction

    With the deployment of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) into Somalia in 2011 to pursue members of al-Shabaab, incidents of religious-based violence ascribed to jihadi groups have increased in the country. It appears that religious radicalization of some Kenyan Muslims is becoming endemic, especially in the predominantly Muslim-inhabited areas in the country, viz. the coast and the north-eastern regions. Several Muslims from these areas have in recent times been indicted for their alleged links with al-Shabaab and other jihadi groups. It is alleged that these Muslims, and those similarly minded, pose a great danger to the plural Kenyan society, due to their exclusivist ideology. It is in this context, that this article aims to examine the divergent views of Muslim and Christian leaders, with regard to their public pronouncements, and perceptions of occurrences of purported religiously-based violence against non-Muslims in Kenya, as these are attributed to the jihadi groups. To the Muslim leaders, economic marginalization and the inequitable distribution of resources rouse discontent and dissatisfaction among Muslims, which vulnerably expose different categories of Muslims to the jihadist emancipation call. To Christian leaders on the other hand, Muslims are not the only ones economically marginalized in the country. For them, one of the main factors for the radicalisation of some Muslims and their joining of jihadi groups, is the indoctrination and ideological agitation of so-called 'radical Islam' by charismatic Muslim leaders (imams).



    Background and Context

    Between December 2013 and November 2014, a group of Muslims, affiliated to the jihadi Muslim faction, took control of certain mosques (Musa, Sakina, Swafaa and Mina) in Mombasa to serve as centres for preaching their ideology and brand of Islam (Jumbe & Beja 2013; Igunza 2014). While breaking up and dispersing a 'jihad convention' in Mombasa, the police raided Masjid Musa (renamed Masjid Shuhadaa) in February 2014, and allegedly recovered a gun, machetes, laptops, al-shabaab flags and other ' militant' training materials from the mosque (BBC News, February 2014). A month later, two gunmen raided Jesus Joy Church in the coastal city, killing seven people and injuring several others (Bocha 2014). By the end of November 2014, sixty-four Kenyans had been executed in a Mandera attack, targeting non-Muslims living in the region (Mohammed 2014). Coupled with other incidents of attacks targeted at non-Muslims1, Christian leaders have rejected the argument of economic deprivation, insinuating religious indoctrination by charismatic leaders as a factor driving some Muslims joining the jihadi movement.

    These attacks have, undoubtedly, raised anxiety and the level of religious tension in the country, with Christian Church leaders feeling vulnerably exposed to the exclusivist jihadi ideology (Deacon et al. 2017). With increased cases of violence attributed to the jihadists, issues of religious radicalisation, certain Islamic concepts, mosque management, and imams' religious sermons have become subjects of scrutiny and concern for the general Kenyan public (Abdulahi 2014). One can even say that there is a quiet rage simmering among Christians, against Islam, as illustrated in some of the comments by a section of Christian clergy. Some of these Church leaders even make blanket statements, declaring the entire Muslim community as enemies of the Christian faith (Mbogoh & Karanja 2014), thereby undermining efforts of mutual interaction in a plural society. This view of a group of Christian Church leaders runs counter to the one espoused by the anti-jihadi Muslim clerics who call upon their non-Muslim counterpart to join them as partners to dialogue and reflect together in defeating religious radicalization.

    The jihad doctrine remains an issue that has attracted intense debate among both Muslims and non-Muslims on the meaning, scope and purpose of the concept2. In essence, at the individual level, jihad means one's inner struggle to lead a righteous life in accordance to God' s commandments. On the other hand, at the collective level, jihad could take various forms that include the physical jihad, which call upon Muslims to raise arms and defend themselves against aggression. It is this understanding of jihad that is employed in this article. Due to the problem of interpretation, the physical jihad has erroneously been stated to refer to a 'holy war' declared by Muslims against non-Muslims (Zawati 2015; Rubenstein 2010; Firestone 2004). Consequently, in this article, jihadi (distinct from jihad) refers to those groups of Muslims who uses physical violence and aggression to establish an Islamic state thereby threatening stability of their respective countries (Elischer 2015). The jihadi movement in Kenya is a conglomeration of groups that espouse a violent form of jihad discourse in the country. Though these groups are affiliated to al-Shabaab, they sometimes operate independently and they include the al-Hijra, Jaysh Ayman and al-Muhajiroun groups.

    Most of the studies done on the subject of 'religious violence' present the thesis that there is a strong interplay between religion and conflict, a view utterly rejected by Ronald E. Osborn. In his critique, Osborn argues that the framing of conflict as ' religious' is a political project with a specific historical foundation, which discloses and obscures the nature of social violence. Osborn stresses that the terms used in the construction of 'religious violence' might as well be applied in reference to violence initiated by ' secular' nation-states (Osborn 2014). Richard Jackson expresses similar ideas, arguing that the phrase ' Islamic terrorism' is a contested and politicized term influenced by dominant narratives. Jackson is of the view that ' Islamic terrorism' is a socially constructed idea intended to advance ' discrete political projects and reify a particular kind of political and social order' (Jackson 2007). Apart from this refutation of the connection of ' religion and conflict' , ' religion and terrorism' , other studies on the subject in Africa have focused on addressing the question: What makes people susceptible to the violent extremist ideology of the jihadi groups?

    In answering this question, Anneli Botha (2013) identifies the root cause to this phenomenon of religious violence to be embedded in domestic or local conditions, which are often exploited by the jihadist leaders to recruit new followers. And, within the Kenyan context, Botha (2013) is of the view that it is primarily the ' socioeconomic, political, religious, national identity, counter-terrorism and internal/personal factors' that are the major drivers that draw people 'into radical groups'. Similar views are shared by Ioannis Gatsiounis (2012), William Rosenau (2005), Hassan Mwakimako and Justin Willis (2014). While examining cases of violence evident on the Kenyan coast, Mwakimako and Willis (2014) argued that the resultant violence evident in the region 'is the consequences of the profound inequalities of Kenya's political system, as much as of international Islamic radicalism. Those who are involved in the violence have pulled these multiple strands together'.

    Clearly evident in these studies is the ascribing of plural-causal theory to the phenomenon of religious violence in Kenya, a trend that is also evident in other parts of Africa. In exploring the attraction to Boko Haram, a jihadi group operating in Northern Nigeria, William Hansen (2016) maintained, 'In the case of Boko Haram there are multiple factors that one needs to consider; some of them religious, some (especially) cultural, some ethno-linguistic, some even psychological.... There are, indeed, multiple factors involved'. Despite assigning a multiplicity of factors to the phenomenon in Kenya, Rosenau (2005), though, concludes that religious extremism has failed to take strong root in the country, a situation that has currently changed as evident in recent events and studies.

    Contrary to looking at causal socio-cultural factors that radicalise some Muslims as briefly shown above, Sarah Feuer (2016) addresses the interventionist and solution aspect to the phenomenon of religious violence, by examining the involvement of Moroccan and Tunisian institutions of state Islam in combating violent extremism. Her study focuses on the perceptions of religious leaders on violence, which frame the public discourse on the subject in a non-violent register, for their followers in the respective countries. On her part, Angela Rabasa (2009) proposes various effective long-term solutions to the emerging trend of violence attributed to ' radical Islam' in the East African region, of which only three touches on the marginalization and religious indoctrination perspectives themes addressed in this article. The purposively identified three solutions advanced by Rabasa (2009) include: (i) Deter external support of radical groups operating in East Africa; (ii) reduce the influence of foreign Islamist organizations by identifying mainstream and Sufi Muslim sectors and helping them propagate moderate interpretations of Islam and delegitimize terrorism; and (iii) begin to remove barriers to economic growth in order to promote economic opportunity and thereby reduce the pool of potential jihadi recruits.

    Despite the fact that both the religious indoctrination and the various forms of marginalization have driven some sections of Kenyan Muslims into joining jihadi groups, it appears that Christian and Muslim clerics inside Kenya, seem to only emphasize one side of the argument - either the socioeconomic causes or the indoctrination argument - and ignoring the other. These are the two main focuses this article explores in detail. In order to address them systematically, the article addresses the following questions consecutively:

    • How do the Muslim religious leaders frame the argument for marginalization and discrimination as reasons for the phenomenon of religious violence in the country?
    • How do Christian clergy frame the argument for religious indoctrination and exclusivist preaching of the Jihadists, as causes for the religious violence in the country?
    • How do the Muslim clerics' self-criticism manifest? and,
    • How is the public rhetoric of both Christian and Muslim clergy to be understood in the context of jihadi violence?​
    In order to address these questions, I use framing theory, as advanced by Gitlin (1980), De Vresse (2005) and Jackson (2007). According to T. Gitlin (1980) 'framing' comprises of the production of 'persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse'. In other words, framing is concerned with the presentation of an issue by emphasizing the importance of a specific aspect of the same subject (De Vresse 2005). As is demonstrated in the subsequent sections, the Muslim and Christian religious leaders selectively produce specific patterns in terms of which the phenomenon of jihadi violence is thought about, interpreted, and represented. In so doing, they select a certain number of impressions, perspectives, and representations, and emphasise these, at the cost and exclusion of others. These can be grouped in terms of either a theory that religious violence is the result of indoctrination, or that it comes about due to radicalisation and socioeconomic marginalisation. Both camps, in fact construct a narrative that frames the phenomenon, and, as such, appears mutually exclude the one from the other. Drawing on Jackson (2007), it is my objective in this research, to problematize these two framing narratives (of the phenomenon of religious violence), through the prism of discourse analysis. The article will demonstrate ' the politics of representation' at work with regard to this phenomenon, and also problematize the presumed intentions of embracing one specific 'mode of representation over another' rather than another (Jackson 2007).



    The Marginalization and Discrimination Argument by Muslim Clerics

    Economic injustices against sections of the Kenyan Muslim population are deep-seated historical injustices, and a sense of marginalisation among the community exists. It is suggested that this condition, provides a fertile ground for the mobilisation of domestic jihadi groups, like the al-Hijra, Jaysh Ayman and al-Muhajiroun, to perpetrate criminal acts and different forms of atrocities on especially non-Muslim civilians. In addition, they are supported by the al-Shabaab movement, which endeavours to regionalise and localise its violent jihad discourse. Perceptions of marginalization has fostered a favourable environment for spreading jihadi ideas among sectors of the Muslim community in Kenya. The demographic concentration of Muslims on the Kenyan coast and the north-eastern regions, means that it is also here, that we find an aggregating of Muslim discontent with government. These areas are severely marginalised in government development projects, and it is here, that Muslims experience the most acute forms of deprivation and destitution. Over the last two decades, this perception has escalated, in so far, in the words of (Ochiel 2015), Muslims here 'feel increasingly marginalised, with the government' s promises of equitable development' , being broken. Such sentiments insinuate that certain groups of Kenyan Muslims are attracted to the jihadi movement as a result of economic frustration.

    Because of this viewpoint Muslim leaders have suggested that it is crucial to improve the living standards in regions predominantly inhabited by Muslims, the coast and the north-eastern areas, which generally have a higher incidence of poverty than other regions (Njonjo 2013). The concern is that those segments of the Muslim community that feel disadvantaged are more susceptible in enlisting into the jihadi groups. The Muslim residents of these regions have continuously complained of fewer access to land and jobs, than upcountry people where the majority are Christians (Akwiri 2014). In their demands, Muslim leaders called upon the political leadership of the Kenyan government to,

    address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, e.g. discrimination, unemployment,historical injustices, marginalization, corruption, harassment by police and other security agencies (e.a.; Standard Team 2015).​
    Although the Muslim leaders enlist numerous factors as drivers causing Muslims to join jihadi groups, they can be all summarised as factors that give rise to different forms of socio-economic and socio-cultural marginalization and discrimination. If we use De Vresse's(2005) distinction between the 'powerlessness' and 'responsibility' frames to analyse these sentiments and perceptions among Muslims, the powerlessness frame reveals that Muslims in these areas do not have any marked influence on the conditions in which they live. This is mainly due to the ' dominance' of political power, and therefore also socio-economic investment by upcountry Christians, in predominantly Christian areas and not Muslim areas. The reality is that the minority Muslims' condition in Kenya is appalling, forcing some of them into the jihadi movements. The flipside of this argument, is that, in terms of the responsibility frame, Muslims cannot be blamed for either their condition, nor the fact that some join the jihadi movements. The blame for religious violence, is then laid at the door of government, and the State, for failing to address the root causes of the various forms of marginalization and discrimination.

    Moreover, reports have shown, that the rural economy of the coastal and north-eastern regions is in a state of collapse, a consequence of the adverse effects exacerbated by the ineffective governance of the postcolonial regimes (Njonjo 2013). Because of the economic deprivation, the impoverished category of the Muslim community explores opportunities to survive, which see them turning to the jihadi groups. And due to the seemingly relative success of their Christian compatriots, Muslims' resentment increases, fuelling ethno-religious-regional hatred, making religiously-based violence 'more attractive to the desperate and dispossessed' (Hansen 2016). In addition, the perception created by Muslim clerics is that the members of the jihadi movement in Kenya are always the unemployed sections of the community - those who suffer marginalization and discrimination. This underscores the finding of a 2009 study in Europe, that found that most of the jihadist members of jihadi groups in Europe, while well educated, middle class and well integrated individuals in European societies, were driven to jihadi acts by their 'perceived suffering of their brothers in the Islamic world' (Mutua 2015).

    Similarly, after the gruesome attack on Garissa University in Kenya in 2015, where 148 people were killed, and 79 more injured, one of the perpetrators was identified as Abdirahim Abdullai who was a young and educated individual described as a brilliant promising lawyer. Upon completion of his law degree studies, the young man from a middle level family had allegedly secured employment with a local bank as a legal officer (Mutua 2015). The other is Ahmed Ayman, a former engineering student at Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) believed to have been recruiting Kenyan Muslims into the jihadi movement operating both in Kenya and Somalia. And the last is the slain Luqman Osman Issa, accused of involvement in jihadi activities, who held a Business Administration degree from a Ugandan university, and was regarded to be the commander of Jaysh Ayman, a jihadi group active at the Kenyan coast, and supposedly formed in 2001 with the assistance of Sheikh Aboud Rogo (Standard Team 2015). These facts confirm that not all members of the jihadi groups are necessarily drawn from economically marginalized segments of the Muslim society. But, just because one has a university degree, comes from a middle-class family and has secured employment, likewise does not stop one from sympathizing with the majority poor and marginalised. The support for the jihadi movement emerges because of the fact that it speaks to the views of many Muslims who feel ignored by the postcolonial political leadership dominated by upcountry Christians. The occasional involvement, therefore, of the privileged segment of the Muslim community in the activities of the jihadi movement does not disprove the marginalization theory, since, it appears that it is driven by fellow Muslim identification with the poor and marginalised.

    That stated, though, the fact is that the majority of the jihadists are people who are unemployed or unemployable, and who are voluntarily joining the violent movements. Due to their sense of frustration, marginalization, and alienation, many of these individuals feel that 'their hopes and chances in life have been taken away from them' and hence the only alternative left for them, is the allure of a good life presented by these movements (Ng' ulia 2015). Even so, while it is true that many of the members in the jihadi movements could be from poor backgrounds, it is also a fact that that the majority Muslims in Kenya, who find themselves living in the same conditions, with the same frustrations, have chosen not to associate with groups that advocate violence (Karega 2015). This means that there are other factors at play that attract people to joining the jihadi groups. And according to the Kenyan Christian clergy, the desire to joining these groups is ' primarily' driven by religious propaganda and indoctrination by charismatic leaders.



    Religious Indoctrination and Exclusivist Preaching of the Jihadists: Christian Clerics' Views

    Within the Kenyan context the appearance of jihadi ideology could be traced to the influx of Saudi Arabia-trained-local and expatriate preachers at the turn of the century who gradually took over mosques and madrassas in the Coast and North-Eastern regions. The preachers from Pakistan, Yemen and other countries were funded by Saudi Arabia and introduced a Wahabi-Salafi form of Islam that, among other beliefs, rejected co-existence not just with other faiths, but also with divergent factions of the Islamic faith (Gaitho 2015). Through their madrassas and the mosques, they served as centres for propaganda, indoctrination and recruitment that emphasized that the central message of the jihadi ideology is a struggle of a religious nature, which has to be won in order to defend the faith that is being threatened (Karega 2015). In their exclusivist sermons addressed to Kenyan Muslims, these preachers proclaimed the fighting against all those who were not of their own persuasion for the alleged danger they pose to Islam, and that they should be defeated in battle.

    In addition, the conceptualization of non-Muslims, as well as those Muslims who do not support their ideology, as unworthy human-beings and ' enemies', provided the ideological leverage to preach against those who were supposedly the source of 'suffering', and the bedevilling of the general Muslim community in Kenya. The cultivation of related attitudes provided the justification for various acts of aggression against non-Muslims, such as the Westgate siege (21 September 2013), the Mandera bus incident (22 November 2014) and the Garissa University College attack (2 April 2015). In all these jihadi onslaughts, the jihadists' targets, were non-Muslims, who they dehumanized and portrayed as oppressors, and 'disbelievers'. Once war-mongerers believe that fellow human beings are not human, they can be activated for the attack and killing of the perceived 'enemy' (Karega 2015). All the victims of the jihadists' violence were required to prove their faith by reciting the shahada (the proclamation of faith), failure to which, they were killed. In the process, those who were able to prove their Islamic faith by pronouncing the kalimat (declaration of faith) were spared their lives. Clearly, this shows that there is a religious motif behind the violent attacks of the jihadi groups as they openly assert to be advancing the cause of Islam by sparing Muslims who can recite the declarations of faith (Oginde 2015).

    Due to these facts, a section of the Christian clergy in Kenya has come to the conclusion that it is not marginalization that drives some Muslims into joining the jihadi movements, but rather the brand of Islam being propagated by their clerics. This viewpoint is typical of a specific genre of anti-jihadi movement Christian scholarship, produced by Church leaders in Kenya. Within Islam, there is no doubt that religious identity and loyalty to the faith, have been confirmed, to be powerful instruments for the mobilization of jihadis as well as for propagation, inspiration, and the validation for the actions of the jihadi warriors (Hansen 2016). According to Botha's (2013) study, around 87% of Muslim youths who joined the al-Shabaab movement (read, jihadi groups) was due to 'religious' reasons while only 4% were influenced by economic reasons, confirming the concerns of the Christian clergy. But such figures as indicated in the above study should be interrogated and not taken at face value.

    A careful interpretive analysis of the jihadi groups' literature reveals that their major concerns are not religious, but political, and, that their use and application of religious symbols in their propaganda, is merely ' instrumental rather than primary' (Jackson 2007). Although the jihadists' discourse is frequently expressed in religious language, it should be viewed as a variety of ' secular or nationalist protest at external and internal domination and forms of exclusion' thereby espousing a revolutionary ideology (Jackson 2007). For instance, the literature and videos produced by al-Shabaab suggest that the movement is pursuing clear political goals, including: support for the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia; ending non-Muslims 'occupation' of so called 'Muslim land' in Kenya; and supporting local jihadi insurgencies in Kenya (Hussein 1434; Press Office 1434; Video, 'Mpeketoni'; Rogo sermon 2012.) For the jihadists, therefore, religion is significant, but only as part of a whole ideology that seeks to verbalise and channel certain local political grievances.

    Furthermore, despite the Christian clergy's denial of the marginalization theory as the attraction into joining jihadi groups in Kenya, it is a fact that the vast bulk of the jihadists come from the poor, destitute, and the dispossessed segment of society. As pointed out earlier, it is the conditions in which the poor live, that gives rise to discontent, and also provides the milieu in which the jihadi movements recruit the majority of its militant supporters -from the poor and impoverish underclasses. This is because to them (the destitute), Islam represents a call to justice, and a return to the glorious past. This is an appealing message to those who are dispossessed and struggle to survive. As victims of perceived marginalization attributed to an oppressive system of politics and governance, the destitute amongst the Muslims readily find consolation in religion, and turn to it, to seek justification for their revolutionary ideas and practices
    Religious Indoctrination or Marginalization Theory? Muslim-Christian Public Discourses and Perceptions on Religious Violence in Kenya
     

    Iron Maiden

    Her Royal Brincess
    Staff member
    #12
    I personally was targeted by extremists Zionists on Israeli pages on Facebook. These people presumed that I was a Muslim because of my Arabic name. Maybe they thought I was Palestinian
    The first thing that they would do is spam you with images insulting Muslims.
    Then they would report posts to Facebook to block the account.
    This is even if posts were not agressive or offensive in anyway.
    Several Zionists will then make a pact to accuse you of hate speech so that your account is closed by Facebook.
    But Facebook always brought my account back and punished me for only a week for doing nothing. They also evaluate my posts based on the false reports
    I fail to see how facebook’s report function has anything to do with radicalization of muslim youth through targetted attacks by christians and zionists :/
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #13
    I fail to see how facebook’s report function has anything to do with radicalization of muslim youth through targetted attacks by christians and zionists :/

    Because I was analyzing how others who were spammed with similar posts reacted to insulting their religion by creating a direct link between Islam and terrorism. These individuals reacted violently and defensively. I was targeted because I acted calmly and was disinterested in the insult. This made the group of Zionists furious, they spammed my page on Facebook with threats. Someone said to me "you are the most dangerous type. " "I will get you out of Canada." This was on an Israeli website. I was also attacked on the National Post by right wing Christian conservatives, who used similar intimidating techniques. We can see that these techniques are also used in here by some radical Christian members who attack Muslim moderate members or members that they suspect may be Muslim. My hypothesis is that these are organized activities by radical Christian and Zionist right wing underground organizations.

    I am an ethnographer working on this type of research and I pretended to be a far right supporter and found out that my hypothesis was right. Several groups work together to manipulate public opinion about confessional relations between Christian, Jew and Muslim. They also prepare a text and share it and inform you of the articles published online that you should spam and target to make it look like a conflict, but the conflict may not actually exist at the public level even though it is framed to exist on the media by provocations made by fake accounts.

    Saudi Arabia has been following the same techniques to shun opposition and manipulate public opinion by fake accounts created by such organizations online.

    If I was a person who held into Muslim beliefs and was also a moderate, I would take the spam of insults against Islam as an attack on my person and my group. This then would lead to my desire to revenge and become a possible recruit for Islamic radical organizations.

    We can observe this phenomenon here on this Forum, where we find that secular and moderate members who are also Muslim become anti-Christian and adopting an Islamic identity, when Christian radicals bombard them with attacks and also keep reporting their posts. The fact that posts of the Muslims get reported and deleted, when the posts of the radical Christians don't creates a feeling of injustice, isolation, and alienation. These feelings play a fundamental role in making these individuals vulnerable subjects for organized terrorist recruitment because of the injustice created by the action.

    [holy flaming war]
     
    Last edited by a moderator:

    Isabella

    The Queen Of "Bazella"
    Orange Room Supporter
    #14
    Because I was analyzing how others who were spammed with similar posts reacted to insulting their religion by creating a direct link between Islam and terrorism. These individuals reacted violently and defensively. I was targeted because I acted calmly and was disinterested in the insult. This made the group of Zionists furious, they spammed my page on Facebook with threats. Someone said to me "you are the most dangerous type. " "I will get you out of Canada." This was on an Israeli website. I was also attacked on the National Post by right wing Christian conservatives, who used similar intimidating techniques. We can see that these techniques are also used in here by some radical Christian members who attack Muslim moderate members or members that they suspect may be Muslim. My hypothesis is that these are organized activities by radical Christian and Zionist right wing underground organizations.
    And did you suddenly feel the urge to go blow yourself up? How about now, do you feel it now? I think you should keep trying!

    I am an ethnographer working on this type of research and I pretended to be a far right supporter and found out that my hypothesis was right. Several groups work together to manipulate public opinion about confessional relations between Christian, Jew and Muslim. They also prepare a text and share it and inform you of the articles published online that you should spam and target to make it look like a conflict, but the conflict may not actually exist at the public level even though it is framed to exist on the media by provocations made by fake accounts.
    What you are is a stubborn individual who seems incapable of reasoning and instead keeps posting garbage... People on the forum have indulged you far too much, the most you deserve is a friendly advice to go get your meds checked



    [Holy jihad of flaming]
     
    Last edited by a moderator:

    Dark Angel

    Legendary Member
    #16
    Online radicalization of Muslim moderate youth is a process normally instigated and organized by Christian and Zionist extremist entities operating online. The objective of such radicalization is to construct a confessional conflict between people who would only see their identity religiously. How does radicalization take place?
    Have you been a victim of radicalization by extremist Christian and Zionist intelligence operating online? and what should you know before you change yourself from being a moderate secular into a radical Muslim?
    I am posting articles for your info in the following posts, and would like to discuss with members on the Forum especially Muslims how does imbalanced moderation of their posts impacts their feelings towards Christians and Jews? How does such alienation make them feel about Islam and how does it modify their identity?
    impressive. this is like nestle's condensed milk. you have poured in all of your essence and concentrated it in a single zipped paragraph.

    just aim at being a slightly better person tomorrow, take baby steps, and few weeks down the road you will notice a difference.
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #17
    impressive. this is like nestle's condensed milk. you have poured in all of your essence and concentrated it in a single zipped paragraph.

    just aim at being a slightly better person tomorrow, take baby steps, and few weeks down the road you will notice a difference.
    Why is it that I am not surprised?
     

    JB81

    Legendary Member
    #19
    Can we consider this type of accusation as part of the radicalization process.
    Creating a link between reading the Quran and terrorism defacto creates a confessional conflict as here we have an assertion that reading the Quran makes people radical, when the accusation itself triggers the process of transformation.
    Why if anyone criticized Islam, it creates radicalism in Muslim youths and turn them violent?
     

    Mighty Goat

    Legendary Member
    Orange Room Supporter
    #20
    Why if anyone criticized Islam, it creates radicalism in Muslim youths and turn them violent?
    There are several scientific theories posted above. They provide some explanations to the process of radicalization, which are open for debate in this thread, but I am certain that reading the Quran has no scientific relationship to radicalization.
    I don't know where did you read that criticism of Islam leads to radicalization in my post though!
     
    Last edited:
    Top