Islamism in lebanon

[taifoon]

They ALL have their "higher Umma cause" don't they? That "cause" has been around for over a thousand years and shows absolutely no signs of going away.

Whatever, you do notice however that you are starting to serve me poems here, don't you?
If you stick to only Gambills article we'd probably have more constructive interaction.

Are the HA arms to "protect" from an Umma cause of the Sunni? Is that what you think Hezbollah is all about?

No, but apparently that is what you think i think Hizbollahs arms are all about. You seem to be not only able to misread and misunderstand what you read, but also much willing to project your misreading and misunderstanding of what you read on others.. Now for the sake of curiosity, where did i think that this is what Hizbollahs arms are about? Or for that matter where did you read that Gambill wrote that? Actually if you, again, read well Gambill , this is what he had to say among other things about Hizbollah:

As Hizballah recast itself as a national liberation movement, it effectively abandoned the pursuit of an Islamic state in Lebanon.[17] Although Hizballah leaders called for ending the political system organized along the lines of religious community (a step which arguably could pave the way for an Islamic state down the road by first enshrining majority rule), they displayed far less inclination to root out "un-Islamic" influences in Lebanese society than even the most mainstream Sunni clerics (see below).[18]

While Hizballah's "Lebanonization" (and Nasrallah's Clintonesque public statements)[19] led many outside observers to predict that it would promptly lay down its arms and become a "normal" political party once Israeli troops withdrew from south Lebanon,[20] such forecasts failed to recognize that these choices revealed little about the underlying intentions of Hizballah leaders--beyond a concern with attracting as large a popular base of support as possible within the Shi'a community and Lebanon as a whole. Since religiosity has not been a primary determinant of Shi'a popular support for Hizballah (as shown by Judith Palmer Harik's survey of Shi'a public opinion at the end of the civil war),[21] secular discourse was favored to win non-Shi'a support. Since the goal of "national liberation" garnered broader appeal than other rationales for fighting Israel, nationalist discourse was favored.

Where do you see their shia Umma against the sunnis Umma here?

Do then the Sunni arms (I forget, what is the name of their "army"?) going to stay around to protect from the Umma cause of the Shia? Can't you see this is a vicious circle without end? It is going to be finally fought in Lebanon because the numbers are the most equal?
Foolishness!



We agree on one thing only.

I try to discuss and you are only interested in "argue", but we have both lost patience. As I said before - I understand that it is very difficult and perhaps even impossible to look at these issues with any kind of "objectivity" when "political" concerns override everything. Fortunately, I don't have these "political" concerns.

I don't "defend" anyone, because they have all "messed up" and they are all "wrong". So here is one you haven't heard in a while from me ... There are NO good guys, they are ALL bad. Gambill and I agree that the present government has done a pretty miserable job (I would take it further than he did), but he understands a lot more of the Mid-East than I ever will (since I don't understand much at all), and he also delves into the reasons why some of these things occur .... AND .... the only answer to stop them. An answer you appear to disagree with.

Indeed foolishness, i would be a fool to not calculate with the remote possibility of myself being an idiot at some point in time, or every time i have to deal with universaly unpredictable humans. What you still failed to argue for (not discuss) is the following: You claim in your recurrent posts all over the place that the root of all evil is Hisbollah arms and according to Gambills analysis those arms are smartly declared by Hizbollah for other reasons than an Umma islamiyya cause, a claim supported by reality where very few of those arms, if any, were deliberatly engaged in lebanese sectarian warfare. Facing those arms you have the salafists whose only declared cause is the Umma islamiya. FPM does not fancy Hizbollahs arms even though they are not directly threatning the existence of other religious communities, and hence the MoU, a written, however not yet realised, thought of framework to find a suitable and satisfaying solution to those arms to both Hizbollah and others, and my question is: If some - read wahhabi-salafi sympathizers placed on key positions - claim in closed circles among like-minded that the salafis right to get armed is motivated due to Hizabollahs arms (which are neither declared as a threat against the sunnis nor are aimed at them) what will happen to those salafis arms if/when Hizbollahs arms are integrated into the army? The salafis declared cause is neither fear of nor a will to annihilate Israel nor liberation of their southern lands - however constructed or unreal that may sound to some - nor are they to bargain some lost domestic political rights with, but are plain and straight declared to establish the Umma with.

This is the saudi-hariri cancer Gambill does not explicitly name but actually is hinting at.

Am I the only one who noticed that Gambill never says a word about Hariri funding all these Sunni Islamists?

He names Madame Bahiyya and Siniora here:

The March 14 coalition's struggle to preserve Sunni unity amid Lebanon's escalating postwar political crisis widened the latitude enjoyed by Salafi-jihadists, as Hariri was understandably reluctant to enter into a confrontation with fellow Sunnis. The Siniora government therefore did nothing to reverse Jund al-Sham's pre-war seizure of the neighborhood of Ta'mir adjacent to Ayn al-Hilwah or to prevent it from terrorizing the inhabitants. The militants finally allowed the army to deploy in Ta'mir only after Bahiya Hariri (Sa'd's aunt) paid them off in early 2007

Read this V E R Y V E R Y V E R Y S L O W L Y

After the elections, the newly–elected parliament rewarded the Salafists with an amnesty law that freed 26 Dinniyeh militants and seven of the Majdal Anjar detainees still in custody awaiting trial.[59] In addition, the government established a quid pro quo with Salafi-jihadists, allowing them to operate with minimal interference by the state so long as they did not carry out attacks in Lebanon itself, an arrangement openly acknowledged by pro-March 14 Lebanese and Saudi media

And this, Read it S L O W L Y:

While Absi presented Fatah al-Islam as an all-Palestinian movement,[71] most of the hundreds of volunteers who answered his call over the next six months were Lebanese[72] and a substantial minority were Saudis,[73] Syrians, and nationals of various other Arab and Islamic countries. Astonishingly, this massive expansion took place with little interference from the government.[74] Despite having been convicted in absentia for the Foley murder, Absi operated in the open, even playing host to journalists from the New York Times (which noted obliquely that "because of Lebanese politics" he was "largely shielded from the government

Also this, T A K E Y O U R T I M E

While there is little evidence to support claims by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh and others that March 14 leaders encouraged the growth of Fatah al-Islam and other armed Islamist groups as counterweights to Hizballah,[76] the coalition was clearly reluctant to pay the hefty political premium of confronting a well-financed and provisioned Sunni jihadist group operating within the protection of a Palestinian refugee camp. It was not until Fatah al-Islam robbed its third bank in the Tripoli area and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch visited Beirut to press the issue in May 2007 that Siniora finally sent the ISF into action with a pre-dawn raid on a Fatah al-Islam safehouse.

That seems to be a "proven fact" on this forum, along with Hariri and the Future Movement being Wahhabis. This is called painting all with the same paintbrush, just as saying that all Shia are Hezbollah or all Christians are Maronite. None are true.

The escalation in sectarian bigotry in all of Lebanon is a very real concern and it is coming from all corners. It is the most disappointing from a political party that included "anti-sectarianism" into it's principles.

Maybe you are asking for filmed video tapes with plain confessions from Siniora or Hariri or one of their higher aids.. hummm.. let me check if i have some and i'll get back to you, fair enough?

 

[Synarchia]

It's a shame to see such a great article being criticised just because it doesn't provide FPM with enough "bashing the government" material.

on another note, this seems pretty credible, but there's a lot to add. The rise of Sunni fundamentalism from a sociological perspective is missing IMHO. It's also not as easy to admit that Sunnis are more fanatics than Shias... there is no such thing as degrees of fanatism, you're either a fanatic or not, the rest is just a matter of pragmatism. The main difference between HA and Sunni fundamentalists is that unlike Sunni fanatics who are way too disorganized and subject to a wide range of foreign pressures, Shia fundamentalism could actually succeed in eventually turning lebanon into a shia state through much more subtle and patient ways.

 

[taifoon]

It's a shame to see such a great article being criticised just because it doesn't provide FPM with enough "bashing the government" material.

Is this a spinal reaction from someone whose reply is quicker than his reading and understanding of what he reads? Or rather from someone who replies before reading whatsoever. Where do you read anyone FPMer critisizing this article, dude? It is the complete opposite: We are praising it, and not ONLY because it contains enough 'bashing government' material.

on another note, this seems pretty credible, but there's a lot to add. The rise of Sunni fundamentalism from a sociological perspective is missing IMHO.

True, although Gambill hinted at that too. How do you explain however relatively wealthy saudis overflowing us with Fath el-Islam moutafajjiroun?

It's also not as easy to admit that Sunnis are more fanatics than Shias... there is no such thing as degrees of fanatism, you're either a fanatic or not, the rest is just a matter of pragmatism.

You are absolutely correct, there doesn't exist degrees of fanatism, and Gambill did not touch on that neither.

The main difference between HA and Sunni fundamentalists is that unlike Sunni fanatics who are way too disorganized and subject to a wide range of foreign pressures, Shia fundamentalism could actually succeed in eventually turning lebanon into a shia state through much more subtle and patient ways.

To some, there's another more important difference, which you also seem to deliberatly want to avoid, namely this:

HA does not claim anymore, at least not in the open nor officially, that it strives to achieve an islamic republic, because i beleive it realized this is not achievable within the sectarian equilibrium of Lebanon, not within a centurys perspective nor two and especially in the regional container it finds itself eternally stuck in, with a jewish state at its southern borders and an assumingly sunni one at the east and north.

On the other hand, Sunni salafis still hold to the wetdream of such Umma- the only one dream, mind you- especially when prerequisites exist in the form of presumed advantageous demographic environment.

 

[Kibitzer]

Whatever, you do notice however that you are starting to serve me poems here, don't you?
If you stick to only Gambills article we'd probably have more constructive interaction.



And speaking of analogue tunnel vision, I asked you: " Moreover, since Gambill hints at HAs arms as possible tolerated excuse for those salafis arms, i wonder what will happen to those arms when/if HAs arms are dropped? You still have their higher Umma cause, don't you? "

Works for me ..... afterall, I only responded to your post and quoted it also. These were your words, not Gambills.

You claim in your recurrent posts all over the place that the root of all evil is Hisbollah arms

Perhaps you could find for me exactly where I have ever said this. I'll be waiting :wink:

This is the saudi-hariri cancer Gambill does not explicitly name but actually is hinting at.

While you are looking for my post about the "evil" of Hezbollah ...... please post Gambrills about the saudi-hariri cancer.

You are looking more foolish with each post Taifoon. Gambrill does not give Hariri, the Lebanese Government or Sunni community a "pass" on anything and it is the same for Hezbollah and the Shia community. He also does not "blame" either of these communities for all the ills of Lebanon ..... and neither do I. I did not give either of them a "pass" either. For some ..... it's all or nothing as I noted before. There is no middle ground, no shared responsibility, it's all "the other" who is to blame for everything. That should not make sense to anyone and I don't understand how it can make sense to anyone.


I quoted the very last paragraph of this article ....... that's it. It was the conclusion of the article and I was interested to see what others though of Gambill's conclusion. I did not "pick and choose" words hoping to "validate" a position .... I don't have a "position", other than all of you are in one big mess, and it is getting worse by the day with no end in sight, and a whole bunch of people dead.

I've really only seen one politician in Lebanon that I pretty much totally agree with and have respect for. He said in August of 2005 that IF the Majority could not make the hard decisions and get the job done - then they should resign and let the "opposition" take over.

He was correct ........ he was also assassinated. He is pretty much the only person I've seen that is willing to "tell it like it is" and not "like they want it to be".

Never forget ..... you reap what you sow.

 

[Genius]

HA does not claim anymore, at least not in the open nor officially, that it strives to achieve an islamic republic, because i beleive it realized this is not achievable within the sectarian equilibrium of Lebanon, not within a centurys perspective nor two and especially in the regional container it finds itself eternally stuck in, with a jewish state at its southern borders and an assumingly sunni one at the east and north.

On the other hand, Sunni salafis still hold to the wetdream of such Umma- the only one dream, mind you- especially when prerequisites exist in the form of presumed advantageous demographic environment.

The prrof to that Taifoon, is that they joined the governement and ministries and parliament

Previous to their acceptance to others, they were out of all governements, claiming that Islam is the only political model and they would not participate in any infidel system (early speeches oh Nassralah hint to that)

Accepting to share responsabilities in governements means their will to share with others (non muslims, non shias) and accept a "civil" system

 

[taifoon]

While you are looking for my post about the "evil" of Hezbollah ...... please post Gambrills about the saudi-hariri cancer.

You do understand english, don't you Kibitzer? You are a native american, or so you claim. Do you understand the meaning of the word " hinting at" as in

This is the saudi-hariri cancer Gambill does not explicitly name but actually is hinting at

If you are drunk old grandma Kibitzer, just spell it out, and you are excused. Everyone - who is not salafist- have a drink once in a while.
Anyway, here's for the third time the quotes you ask for.

Read S L O W L Y, and if you are unable to do that now due to some toxic fumes, come back later, the quotes will still be here.

The March 14 coalition's struggle to preserve Sunni unity amid Lebanon's escalating postwar political crisis widened the latitude enjoyed by Salafi-jihadists, as Hariri was understandably reluctant to enter into a confrontation with fellow Sunnis. The Siniora government therefore did nothing to reverse Jund al-Sham's pre-war seizure of the neighborhood of Ta'mir adjacent to Ayn al-Hilwah or to prevent it from terrorizing the inhabitants. The militants finally allowed the army to deploy in Ta'mir only after Bahiya Hariri (Sa'd's aunt) paid them off in early 2007

Read this V E R Y V E R Y V E R Y S L O W L Y

After the elections, the newly–elected parliament rewarded the Salafists with an amnesty law that freed 26 Dinniyeh militants and seven of the Majdal Anjar detainees still in custody awaiting trial.[59] In addition, the government established a quid pro quo with Salafi-jihadists, allowing them to operate with minimal interference by the state so long as they did not carry out attacks in Lebanon itself, an arrangement openly acknowledged by pro-March 14 Lebanese and Saudi media

While Absi presented Fatah al-Islam as an all-Palestinian movement,[71] most of the hundreds of volunteers who answered his call over the next six months were Lebanese[72] and a substantial minority were Saudis,[73] Syrians, and nationals of various other Arab and Islamic countries. Astonishingly, this massive expansion took place with little interference from the government.[74] Despite having been convicted in absentia for the Foley murder, Absi operated in the open, even playing host to journalists from the New York Times (which noted obliquely that "because of Lebanese politics" he was "largely shielded from the government

While there is little evidence to support claims by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh and others that March 14 leaders encouraged the growth of Fatah al-Islam and other armed Islamist groups as counterweights to Hizballah,[76] the coalition was clearly reluctant to pay the hefty political premium of confronting a well-financed and provisioned Sunni jihadist group operating within the protection of a Palestinian refugee camp. It was not until Fatah al-Islam robbed its third bank in the Tripoli area and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch visited Beirut to press the issue in May 2007 that Siniora finally sent the ISF into action with a pre-dawn raid on a Fatah al-Islam safehouse.

You are looking more foolish with each post Taifoon. Gambrill does not give Hariri, the Lebanese Government or Sunni community a "pass" on anything

Old Dudette, i am telling you: Either you get yourself together properly, read well before you answer, or spare me your complete mental collapse, because i seems i talk to you 'in the east and you answer me in the west' :biggrin:
For the n'th time: I agree on every single word written by Gambill, and if i state above that Gambill is "hinting at" the Hariri cancer, how do you manage to fomulate this chinese of yours into gibbish?

 

[Se3a]

>>

كان للتكون وللنمط المعماري في بيروت الدور البارز في التوزع والتنوع الديموغرافي الإسلامي المسيحي. وكان النشاط الديني والاقتصادي والاجتماعي والعسكري والسياسي والتربوي، قد إرتبط إلى حد كبير بالتكون المعماري وسيطر على التنوع الديموغرافي، فبناء المساجد والزوايا والكنائس والأديرة والأسواق والخانات والثكنات والسرايا والخسته خانات (المستشفيات) والحمامات والمدارس والأفران، والسجون والأبراج ومرفأ بيروت وسواها من ملامح عمرانية قد أثرت تأثيراً مباشراً في إنتشار وتنوع السكان وفي تطور العلاقات الإسلاميّة ـ المسيحيّة، ذلك أن هذه الملامح كانت مواقع إلتقاء بين الطوائف في بيروت ولبنان.



إن النظام المعماري في بيروت في العهد العثماني يعتبر من أجمل ملامح التراث البيروتي واللبناني والعربي والعثماني، وتشهد الآثار العُثمانيّة المتبقية من منازل ودور وقصور وسرايات وثكن ومدارس ومساجد، جمال وروعة هذا التراث. وعلى سبيل المثال فإن النشاطات الاقتصاديّة كانت ممثلة بالأسواق التجاريّة والصناعيّة والحرفيّة، من بين هذه الأسواق على سبيل المثال والتي كانت قائمة منذ العهد العُثماني:

· سوق الأساكفة

· سوق البازركان

· سوق العطارين

· سوق الحدادين

· سوق القطن

· سوق النجارين

· سوق الصاغة

· سوق الخضار

· سوق الشبقجيّة

· سوق الساحة

· سوق ساحة الخبز

· سوق الشعارين

· سوق القزار

· سوق اللحامين

· سوق التجار

· سوق البياطرة

· سوق الفشخة

· سوق القطايف

· سوق المنجدين

· سوق الخياطين

· سوق المغربلين

· سوق العقادين

· سوق المخللاتيّة

وسواها.

في هذه الأسواق كان يظهر التعايش الإسلامي – المسيحي على حقيقته ، فالهندسة والفكرة المعماريّة من وجود هذه الأسواق المتخصصة، كانت هندسة وفكرة إقتصاديّة، وهذا الهدف الاقتصادي أدى إلى تعميق العلاقات الإقتصاديّة والإنسانيّة والإجتماعيّة، وكانت لها آثار سياسية نتيجة لتبادل الآراء السياسية حول مختلف الأمور، فالأسواق أداة إتصال وتواصل بين اللبنانيين لا يمكن الطعن في أهميتها.



ومن الأهميّة بمكان القول إن بعض العائلات الإسلاميّة والمسيحيّة أقامت لها بعض الأسواق على أملاكها وقامت بتأجير محلاتها للطوائف اللبنانيّة، من بين هذه الأسواق التي تحمل أسماء عائلات على سبيل المثال:

· سوق سرسق

· سوق الجميل

· سوق سيّور

· سوق الطويلة

· سوق أياس

· سوق باب إدريس

· سوق أبو النصر

· سوق التيّان



ومن الأسواق المهمة التي كان يلتقي بها المسلمون والمسيحيون سوق المزاد الشهير في باطن بيروت العُثمانيّة، بالإضافة إلى وجود أسواق أخرى عُرفت بسوق الأرمن وسوق الفرنج.



وكان التنوع المعماري من العوامل الهامة الأخرى في التعايش والتلاقي الإسلامي ـ المسيحي، فمباني الدوائر الحكوميّة والسرايات والمستشفيات والحمامات والخانات (الفنادق)، كانت مواقع إلتقاء. وكان مرفأ بيروت مع مرافئه المتخصصة مثل:

· ميناء الأرز

· ميناء البصل

· ميناء البطيخ

· ميناء الخشب

· ميناء القمح

مراكز إلتقاء التجارة والعمّال والموظفين من مختلف المناطق اللبنانيّة.



وكانت مباني البنوك مثل البنك العُثماني والمحلات التجاريّة وحتى المقاهي مثل:

· مقهى القزاز

· مقهى السراي

· مقهى سوق الأساكفة

· المقهى الكبير

· مقهى المعلقة

· مقهى الناعورة

· مقهى العسكر

· مقهى الحاج داوود

· مقهى البحرين

كلها مبانٍ وأنماط معمارية ليست في حقيقتها وواقعها سوى مواقع تواصل وإلتقاء بين اللبنانيين .



وهكذا يُلاحظ بأن مواقع الأبنية والعمارة قامت بدور أساسي بجذب الطوائف اللبنانيّة وأثرت بدرجة أولى على تعايشهم وتعاملهم مع بعضهم البعض.

ومن هنا ندرك الدارس والباحث والمراقب أهمية العمارة في التعايش في بيروت ولبنان. وكانت المباني، خاصة الحكوميّة منها لها أثر واضح في استمرار الصلات وتعميقها بين اللبنانيين من بين هذه المباني مثلاً:

· بلدية بيروت

· الشرطة

· المالية

· الدوائر العقارية

· البريد والبرق

· شركة مياه بيروت

· شركة الكهرباء

· البرلمان والحكومة

وسواها من مبانٍ حكومية.



وبالرغم من أن بيروت العُثمانيّة شهدت الأحياء أو الحارات الطائفيّة مثل:

· حارة الإسلام

· حارة النصارى

· حارة اليهود

في أن هذه الحارات والأحياء كانت تفرغ من سكانها نهاراً في سبيل الإرتزاق أو كسب العيش من بيع وشراء في الأسواق والقيساريات والمناطق التجارية. ولما تطور العمران في بيروت بدأت هذه الحارات تضمحل، ثم تنصهر في المجتمع البيروتي الأكبر باستثناء الطائفة اليهوديّة التي حافظت فيما بعد على حيّها خارج سور بيروت في المنطقة المعروفة باسم وادي أبو جميل وهو (غيتو) يهودي استمر منعزلاً عن بقية الأحياء منذ العهد العُثماني إلى بداية حرب حزيران 1967م، ثم حرب تشرين 1973م، وكانت بداية أحداث عام 1975م في بيروت إعلاناً نهائيّاً لنهاية هذا الغيتو.





وكانت الطوائف الإسلاميّة والمسيحيّة في بيروت بدأت بالإنتشار خارج السور مما جعل الحارات الطائفيّة تذوب تباعاً في إطار الأحياء البيروتيّة المستحدثة في خارج السور وفي ضواحي المدينة.



وإذا حاولنا تلمس الأنماط المعماريّة وتطورها منذ العهد العُثماني وأثرها في إقامة الأحياء وفي التعايش الإسلامي ـ المسيحي، فإننا نستطيع الإستفادة كثيراً من كتب الرحالة وكتب التاريخ وسجلات المحكمة الشرعيّة في بيروت بما تحويه من عقود بيع وشراء للعقارات في بيروت، كما يمكن الإستفادة كثيراً من الصور التراثيّة لبيروت العُثمانيّة.



وتطالعنا وثيقة من سجلات المحكمة الشرعيّة تدلنا على نمط من أنماط العمارة البيروتيّة، ففي وصف لأحد البيوت بتاريخ 1259هـ1843م يشار إلى أنه في (زاروب شيخ الإسلام من داخل داره وإيوان وقاعة عليها نصف تخت وبير ماء نابع ومطبخ داخله قبو ومرتفقين وسلم حجر في اثناها عليّة يعلوها تخت وفسحة دار وإيوان وعليتين يعلوهما تختين ومرتفق وأيضاً في الدار السفلية سلم لجهة الشمال يصعد منها إلى ظهر القاعة، ويعلو ظهر القاعة إيوان وعليتين خراب ......).



هذه النماذج من البيوت كانت موجودة في حارة الإسلام وحارة النصارى وحارة اليهود، وقد أكدت بعض الوثائق التاريخيّة أن هذه الأحياء التي سميت باسم الطوائف قد أصبحت نتيجة للتطور العمراني أحياء مختلطة وإن كانت قد حافظت على أسمائها الطائفيّة وكان الفضل الأول للعمارة التي أنهت هذه الأحياء الطائفيّة وساهمت في التمازج السكني في بيروت. ومما يدل على ذلك وثائق عُثمانيّة تعود إلى عام 1259هـ1843م تشير إلى وصف بيت صادق المحب ودار بني القوتلي وذلك في أول حارة اليهود لصيق حائط السراي، وأن الدار الخاصة لزاوية المغاربة هي في حارة اليهود قرب بيت الحاج حسين شانوحة.



كما أن حارة النصارى لم تعد إسماً على مسمى نتيجة للتطور العمراني والديموغرافي، حيث تمازج النصارى مع المسلمين في بيوتهم ومحلاتهم وأسواقهم وتجارتهم، وتشير الوثائق ذاتها إلى أن أوقاف أحمد حسين القباني في منطقة سوق الحدادين في ميناء بيروت وفي بستان منيمنة وفي سوق القطن في محلة النصارى في باطن بيروت. وكان يوجد في محلة النصارى تجمّع للبيارتة يتمثل بتجمعات دائمة حول فرن سوق القطن ومعصرة السمسم لسيف الدهان حيث إنتاج الطحينة، ومن ثم مبيع القطن في سوق القطن.

وقد وجد في محلة النصارى من العائلات المسيحيّة والإسلاميّة منها آل التويني وآل الشيخ وأبو زرقوت وشاهين وطراد وآل القبّاني، وآل ياسين وسواهم، وكانت الأفران بحد ذاتها مركزاً للتلاقي منها فرن الحشاش، فرن التويني، فرن الحوت.

وكما الحارات البيروتيّة كانت مركزاً للتعايش الإسلامي ـ المسيحي، كانت الزواريب أيضاً مركزاً للالتقاء. ومن بين هذه الزوارب في باطن بيوت في منتصف القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي:

· زاروب أبو واكد

· زاروب الحاسبيني

· زاروب سوق النجارين

· زاروب شيخ الإسلام

· زاروب الطمليس

· زاروب العجان

· زاروب العيتاني

· زاروب نوفل



وهناك العديد من الأزقة حيث يتلاقى البيارتة ، من بين هذه الأزقة :

· زقاق الحشاش

· زقاق البلاط

أما فيما يختص بالنظام المعماري وهندسة المنازل والدور والقصور والعمارة بشكل عام، فإن هناك ندرة في المصادر التي وصفت وشرحت لنا هندسة المنازل وأشكالها في بيروت في القرن التاسع عشر، غير أننا لجأنا إلى سجلات المحكمة الشرعيّة في بيروت العُثمانيّة، فاستطعنا استخلاص النظام المعماري والهندسي من خلال دراسة عقود البيع والشراء، حيث كان الحاكم الشرعي يحرص على وصف واقع المنازل بشكل دقيق ومنتظم مع ذكر عدد الغرف والسلالم والطوابق والأقبية وأوضاعها.



لقد كانت بيوت البيارتة متواضعة بشكل عام، سقوفها مدعمة بالجسور الخشبيّة، وكان يصعد إلى الطابق العلوي بواسطة سلم حجر داخلي وسلم حجر خارجي، علماً أن بعض البيوت الأخرى كانت سلالمها مصنوعة من الأخشاب، أما المساطب فكانت نمطاً معمارياً تقليدياً موجود أمام بيوت بيروت كافة، كما وجدت في بيروت القديمة وفي ضواحيها القريبة بعض البيوت المتواضعة التي بنيت كلها من الخشب، وكانت تبطن الجدران الخشبية بصفائح من التنك أو التوتياء أو الزنك لمنع الهواء من الدخول إلى المنازل.



ولا بد من تلمس ودراسة بعض وثائق عمليات البيع والشراء التي تفيدنا ـ فيما تفيدنا به ـ في تبيان بعض سمات النظام المعماري في بيروت في العهد العُثماني وهي تعود إلى عام 1259هـ1843م، فقد جرت عملية بيع في كامل البستان المشهور سابقاً ببستان بيت زين المعروف بحصة البرج الكائن في حي الباشورة الشهير خارج مدينة بيروت المحتوي على جلين متلاصقين مشتملين على أرض وغراس أشجار توت وبري وفواكه وعلى عمار واقع في أحد الجلين هو الجل الفوقاني يحتوي على ثلاث بيوت مسقفات بالجسور والأخشاب ويعلوهن فسحة وثلاث علالي، ويصعد إلى العلوي المذكور بسلم حجر من داخل العمار وسلم ثاني حجر براني، ومصطبة أمام العمار لأرض المراح ... بثمن قدره سبعة آلاف قرش فضة أسديّة رايجة سلطانية من غالب نقد البلد ......





وفي عملية بيع وشراء أخرى في عام 1259هـ1843م تظهر بعض النماذج المعمارية في بيروت التي تضمنت ما يلي:

(... وذلك المبيع هو جميع الدارين العلويتين المصعد إليهما بسلم حجر من الرحبة التي أمام زاوية بني القصّار القريب ذلك من القهوة الكبيرة الشهيرة في باطن المدينة المذكورة المشتملة الدار البرانيّة على أربع أراضي يعلو ثلاثة منهم كل واحدة تخت من الخشب ومطبخ وفسحة دار سماوية، ويدخل للدار الجوانيّة بمعبور من الدار البرانيّة وتشتمل الجوانيّة على اودة وتخت يعلوهما إيوان واودة بدون تخت ومطبخ يعلوه تخت من الخشب ومرتفق وفسحة دار وحقوق ظاهرة ومنافع شرعيّة المعلومة الحدود والجهات ....).



وأظهرت بعض الوثائق بعض النماذج المعمارية المتضمنة وجود الإيوان والقناطر والبوائك(Arcades) وهي عقود مدببة تحمل في بعض الأحيان بواسطة أعمدة . وتستخدم البوائك في بعض المناطق كدكاكين للبيع أو الشراء ، بينما تكون في الطابق الثاني من القصر أو المنزل بمثابة شرفات مسقوفة للإطلالة على صحن المنزل أو الحديقة أو الطريق.

ويمكن رؤية البوائك بوضوح في البوائك ـ الواجهات المتعددة لمسجد المصيطبة في بيروت ـ وفي البوائك المطلّة على صحن خان الفرنج في صيدا. وفي بوائك قصر الأمير يونس في دير القمر.



ومن المميزات العامة والأساسيّة قي بيوت بيروت والمرتبطة بالحياة اليوميّة، هو وجود أبار المياه في كل منزل وهي عادة آبار نابعة وليست آبار جمع على غرار ما هو حاصل في القرى، كما ارتبط النظام المعماري في بيروت بميزة قلما لا نجدها في المنازل البيروتية وهي وجود الأقبية تحت المنازل التي كانت تستخدم لأمور تتعلق بحاجيات المنزل.



ومن الأهمية بمكان القول إن بيروت شهدت أيضاً بناء بعض القصور والأبنية الضخمة المشتملة على عدة طوابق وغرف عديدة. ويلاحظ ذلك من خلال دراست الدكتور حسّان حلاق لعقد وعملية بيع أرض ومنزل الراهبة البروسية لويزا بنت غوسطو ده تروت الكائنين في زقاق بني الحص في محلة ميناء الحسن إلى قنصل إمبراطوريّة ألمانيا تيودورو بن فريدريك وبر، وذلك في عام 1259هـ1843م. ولوحظ اتساع البناء وارتفاعه قياساً إلى سواه، وقد بلغ ثمنه 50 ألف قرش. ومن خلال الوصف الوارد في العقد تبين أن الطاق العلوي يحتوي على سبعة عشر غرفة وبيعة صلاة وممشى مرخم مسقف بالخشب في وسط الطابق العلوي وعلى ممشى آخر شمالي مرخم سماوي بدرابزين حديد وممشى صغير شرقي. ويصعد لهذا الطابق بسلمي بلاط.

أما الطابق السفلي فيحتوي على عشرين غرفة ومطبخ وثمانية مرتفعات وعلى فرن وبيتين يلاصقانه، وعلى ثلاثة آبار أحدها نابع واثنان معدان لجمع ماء المطر. ويشتمل هذا البناء على قطعة أرض وعلى جنينتين مشجرتين وعلى تصوينة بثلاثة أبواب وعلى غرفة وحقوق ومنافع شرعيّة.



وبشكل عام فإن بيروت في القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي كانت تتميز بمنازل سقوفها من القرميد الأحمر الموضوع فوق السقوف الخشبية، وبغرف واسعة وسقوف عالية، وإيوان جميل متسع يُسمّى المنزول وهو صالون. وكان يتخلل المنازل شبابيك شرعيّة، وفتحات زجاجيّة مرتفعة مصنوعة من الزجاج الملون وفي غالبية منازل بيروت شرفات في الطابق الأول، في أعلاها فتحات زجاجيّة مصنوعة من الزجاج الملّون، كما يتخلل الغرف بعض فتحات التهوئة، وكانت المنازل البيروتيّة تضّم عادة المتخّت أو التتخيتة التي يعلوها عادة القافعة التي يصعد منها إلى سطح المنزل، حيث السطيحة التي يظللها العرزال ومسابك زهور الفلّ والزنبق والرياحين والياسمين.



والحقيقة فإن العمارة البيروتيّة قامت بدور بارز في تكوين العلاقات الاجتماعيّة بين المسلمين أنفسهم أو بين المسلمين والمسيحيين، فالمنازل المتجاورة بين هذه الفئات أدت إلى ولادة الشعور الإنساني بضرورة التعاون والإلفة والمحبة. وأدت إلى ولادة الشعور بتطبيق النصائح والإرشادات الدينيّة والأحاديث الشريفة منهاالمسلم من سلم الناس من لسانه ويده) و(جارك القريب ولا أخاك البعيد).

كما أثرت الشريعة الإسلاميّة على الأنماط المعماريّة ليس في بيروت وحسب، وإنما في مختلف المناطق الإسلاميّة. فقد جاء في القرآن الكريم:

قُل لِّلمُومنِينَ يَغُضُّوا مِن أَبصَارهِم وَيَحفَظُواْ فُرُوجَهُم

ذَلِكَ أَزكَى لّهُم إِنَّ الله خَبِير بِمَا يَصنَعُونَ
صدق الله العظيم



وقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلّم (ما زال جبريل يوصيني بالجار حتى ظننت أنه سيورثه أو قال خشيت أو يورث).



ومن خلال هذه الأحاديث والأحاديث الكريمة، نرى بأن الحاكم الشرعي في بيروت كان لزاماً عليه أن يراقب العمارة البيروتيّة سواء في أثناء البناء أو بعد الإنجاز وأن يخضعها للشريعة. وكان عليه أن يمنع تنفيذ العمارة المخالفة للشرع. ولهذا فإن كشف العورات كان أمراً مرفوضاً، وهكذا النظر إلى المحرمات، لذا فإن البيروتيين من مختلف الطوائف الإسلاميّة والمسيحيّة كانوا يحرصون على بناء بيوت وغرف لا تطل على بيوت وغرف الجيران، ولا يطل الجيران عليهم وعلى مقر نسائهم وعوراتهم.

وإذا حدثت مخالفات شرعيّة وأخلاقيّة مرتبطة بالنظام المعماري والهندسي، فقد أجازت الشريعة رفع الدعاوى لإنهاء المخالفات.


وبالفعل فقد وقعت بعض المخالفات الهندسيّة والشرعيّة، ففي 28 محرم عام 1280هـ أقام نعوم طنوس نعوم دعوى ضد جاره المسيحي بشارة متري طاسو، لأنه فتح شباكين في طابقيه يطلان على إيوان منزله وفسحة داره ومقر حريمه وجولاتهن، وذلك في محلة القيراط خارج سور بيروت، وأوضح للحاكم الشرعي أن ذلك يعرضه للضرر البين، والتمس الكشف على ما ذكر، فتوجه معه الحاكم الشرعي إبراهيم أفندي الأحدب إلى المكان المتنازع به بحضور طاسو المرقوم. وبعد الكشف والمعاينة على الشبابيك الأربع المذكورة، وجد النائب بأنها تكشف على مقر نساء نعوم، فقيل لبشارة متري طاسو بأنه من حقه أن يفتح ما يكشف على حريم جاره، وأنه يلزمه شرعاً منع الكشف والضرر الذي أحدثه، وصدر الأمر الشرعي بإقفال الشبابيك.

وفي 15 صفر سنة 1280هـ درس مجلس الشرع الحنيف في بيروت دعوى الحاج زكريا حمادة ضد المرأة خان زاده الزعنّي التي عدلت في بنائها في محلة الثكنات مما أحدث ضرراً وكشفاً على مقر نسائه، وكان القرار الشرعي بإيقاف تلك التعديلات المخالفة للشرع.


وفي 18 ربيع الأول سنة 1283هـ أقامت عائشة صالح الدقر على ليلى أحمد الطبّال دعوى بأنها أحدثت طاقتين في حائط بيتها في زاروب المجذوب في باطن بيروت تطل على مقر النساء وعلى مطبخها وداخل بيتها وعلى فسحة دارها. وقد تبين لنائب النفتي الشيخ إبراهيم الأحدب بضرورة إقفال الطاقتين غير الشرعيتين.

وفي 7 صفر سنة 1287هـ تطالعنا دعوى عبد الرحيم الصلح مدير تلغراف بيروت ضد المرأة حافظة مصطفى دندن لأنها أقامت عليّة فوق منزلها في محلة الدحداح في بيروت. وفي العليّة شباكان يطلان على داره ومقر نسائه. وبعد الكشف الشرعي صدر الحكم بإيقاف العمل في العليّة وإبطالها.

وفي 18 صفر سنة 1287هـ أقام جبور بشارة الملحمة دعوى ضد نصر الله جبور خضير، لأنه فتح عليتين وعدة شبابيك تطل على داره ومقر نسائه وعلى داخل غرفه، الكائنة في محلة الدحداح في بيروت، وبعد الكشف الشرعي صدر الحكم بإبطال ما قام به نصر الله من تعديلات هندسيّة في غرف منازله.


وهكذا يُلاحظ أثر الشرع في أنماط الهندسيّة في بيروت. وقد كان على الشارع تنفيذ الضوابط الشرعيّة والأخلاقيّة في ميدان العمارة، لتعميق التعايش بين مختلف الفئات في بيروت العُثمانيّة، ولتنفيذ أحكام الشرع الحنيف.


وتطالعنا بعض كتب الرحالة في وصف الهندسة والعمارة في بيروت في أواخر القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي ـ ولو بإيجاز ـ فقد أشار الشيخ عبد الجواد القاياتي في كتابه (نفحة البشام في رحلة الشام) عام 1882م من أن بيروت مدينة من أعظم المدن الشامية، فهي عالية المباني ، بخلاف عمارتها من داخل السور التي هي عمارة قديمة، أما البناء الجديد في خارج السور وهو على طراز جديد وإتقان موضوع على أعلاه القرميد وفي أطواقه الشبابيك من الحديد، تسيجه الحدائق والجنائن.
وأضاف أن بناء بيروت كله بالحجر الصلب الجاف والكلس ويخلطونه بالرمل الأحمر بعد تنقيته ومن ثم تجفيفه. أما المباني الرفيعة فإنها تضمنت الأعمدة والبلاط من الرخام والنقوش الجميلة وأضاف قائلاً: وبالجملة فبيروت مدينة إسلاميّة ديناً وغيرة وحمية، أوروباوية نظاماً وبناء وحربية ....

ومهما يكن من أمر فإن هذه الدراسة حول العمارة في العهد العثماني في بيروت في القرن التاسع عشر إنما تعطينا فكرة أولية عن الأنماط الهندسيّة والمعماريّة في بيوت ومنازل وخانات بيروت التي كانت بأكثريتها مغطاة بالقرميد الأحمر فوق السقوف الخشبيّة.

وكانت منازل البيارتة الداخلية على النمط الشرقي، قبل تأثرهم بالنمط الأوروبي، فلم تكن الأسرة الأوروبيّة موجودة، ولم تكن خزانات حفظ الثياب متوفرة في البدء، وبصورة إجمالية فقد احتوت بيوت البيارتة على جملة من الأثاث، كانت تتباين من منزل إلى منزل ومن عائلة إلى عائلة ومن بين هذه الموجودات: صندوق خشبي، كراسي خشبيّة، مّد خشبي، طراريح، مساند ويستقيات، فرش، مخدات، لحف وشراشف، نملية لحفظ الأكل والصحون، حمالة خشبيّة لوضع الأكل عليها، خزانة، سرير هز للطفل، مراجيح للأطفال، حصير، سجاد، صدر نحاسي، سطيلة، جرن كبة ومدقة، هاون نحاسي مع مدقة، ضوء زجاجي، فانوس، ساعة، شمعدان، طاسات ومساويك ومشاط، طاولة أكل أرضية، براني لحفظ الزيت والزيتون، تشقيعة الفرش واللحف وتوضع فوق صندوق الخشب عادة، مرآة، البوفيه أو ما يُسمى البوفان، وسوى ذلك من مستلزمات خشبيّة ونحاسيّة وقماشيّة.​

 

[ecce homo]

Hey Taifoon, you're wasting your time. People who fail to convince themselves to understand will never learn or evolve.

He is one major theory in the article worth discussing:

It is no accident that Hizballah's initial failure to respond to the massive upswing of Israeli-Palestinian violence in June 2006 led Zarqawi to issue a rambling tirade against the group for "raising false banners regarding the liberation of Palestine" and "stand[ing] guard against Sunnis who want to cross the border."[63] Nasrallah may have been chomping at the bit to join the fray, but the intensification of Salafi hostility toward Hizballah (in April 2006, آ the authorities arrested nine Lebanese and Palestinian Salafi-jihadists who were allegedly plotting to assassinate Nasrallah)[64] made it virtually imperative to act. Hizballah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in a bloody cross-border raid on July 12, 2006 was perhaps less an act of solidarity than an attempt to upstage Palestinian Islamists and relegitimate itself in Sunni eyes.[65]

For Gambill Hezbollahs kidnapping comes as a reaction to Salafi hostility and not as a reaction to internal politics.

At that time the MOU did not give any effect and was attacked from all internal and external parties. Everybody where telling Hezbollah to disarm and they were truly cornered. I think that the kidnapping was also a reaction to the internal politics, maybe more than the Salafi hostility.

 

[Synarchia]

Is this a spinal reaction from someone whose reply is quicker than his reading and understanding of what he reads? Or rather from someone who replies before reading whatsoever. Where do you read anyone FPMer critisizing this article, dude? It is the complete opposite: We are praising it, and not ONLY because it contains enough 'bashing government' material.

i suggest you reread the replies

True, although Gambill hinted at that too. How do you explain however relatively wealthy saudis overflowing us with Fath el-Islam moutafajjiroun?

that's not a sociological espect. It ttakes more than money to convince Lebanese sunnis to take up arms. Why do you think poor sunnis are so eager to join these fundamentalists groups (spare me the brainwashing ****)

You are absolutely correct, there doesn't exist degrees of fanatism, and Gambill did not touch on that neither.

referring to the replies, not the article.

To some, there's another more important difference, which you also seem to deliberatly want to avoid, namely this:

HA does not claim anymore, at least not in the open nor officially, that it strives to achieve an islamic republic, because i beleive it realized this is not achievable within the sectarian equilibrium of Lebanon, not within a centurys perspective nor two and especially in the regional container it finds itself eternally stuck in, with a jewish state at its southern borders and an assumingly sunni one at the east and north.

warfare is based on deception. Do you honestly believe that a group of a few hundred salafist fighters can turn Lebanon into a islamic state? and if they wanted to, do you believe they will go at it so openly and so quickly???

On the other hand, Sunni salafis still hold to the wetdream of such Umma- the only one dream, mind you- especially when prerequisites exist in the form of presumed advantageous demographic environment.

I'm not sure what you re talking about, but if you're talking about Lebanon, than this is not true. Most figures would point out that even in case of naturalization of all 400k pallies in Lebanon, Shiaa will still largely outnumber the sunnis in Lebanon.

HA does not claim anymore, at least not in the open nor officially, that it strives to achieve an islamic republic, because i beleive it realized this is not achievable within the sectarian equilibrium of Lebanon, not within a centurys perspective nor two and especially in the regional container it finds itself eternally stuck in, with a jewish state at its southern borders and an assumingly sunni one at the east and north

.

HA on the other hand have been working towards the Shia state. I still don't see why it's so hard to believe. They already have their own army, culture, education system, phone lines in parallel with the gov. They negociate with israel as HA not as Lebanon, and they go to war as HA. There are clear aspects of colonization of Beirut through purchase of land in predominantly no Shia areas (i am talking about Beirut because of personal experiance of HA members buying Land at 7 or 8 times its value to drive out Non Shias).

Besides, the bit about the jewish state is outdone. Israel is much more comfortable with a shia state than a sunni islamic one. The fact that Iran and the West are "natural and cultural allies" is no joke. Remember that Israel's main beef is with the arabs not the muslims, and Shias are a lot less bound by their arab identity than sunnis.

But you were right about one thing, they can't build the islamic republic with the current sectarian equilibrium. But assuming Shias are already the majority in Lebanon which is perfectly pausible. it's only natural they try to push for a sectarian state at this point (prediction: they will in the next few years: wanna bet?), Believe it or not, secularism is the fastest way to a Shiite state.

At the end of the day, remember you're dealing with geniuses here, not a bunch of sunni fundamental morons...

now i m gonna take a shower to wipe away the sectarian speech i used in this post, and for which i apologize.

peace

 

[fidelio]

Hey Taifoon, you're wasting your time. People who fail to convince themselves to understand will never learn or evolve.

He is one major theory in the article worth discussing:




For Gambill Hezbollahs kidnapping comes as a reaction to Salafi hostility and not as a reaction to internal politics.

At that time the MOU did not give any effect and was attacked from all internal and external parties. Everybody where telling Hezbollah to disarm and they were truly cornered. I think that the kidnapping was also a reaction to the internal politics, maybe more than the Salafi hostility.

ecce homo, the way i see it, the kidnapping was given the green light ecause the war was inevitable from the Israeli side. As you may remember, 1-2 months before the 12th of July, some missiles were launched from the south and nobody claimed responsibility for that aggression. Brinkmanship was written all over the blue line and HA's kidnapping was an operational advantage for two reasons: they had the element of surprise because they started what was supposed to be a "skirmish" on their own terms and in a chosen moment of readiness. The second reason is the bounty, HA initiated by taking hostages, thus insuring that the Israeli leadership would sooner or later negotiate for their release.

 

[taifoon]

Hey Taifoon, you're wasting your time. People who fail to convince themselves to understand will never learn or evolve.

He is one major theory in the article worth discussing:




For Gambill Hezbollahs kidnapping comes as a reaction to Salafi hostility and not as a reaction to internal politics.

At that time the MOU did not give any effect and was attacked from all internal and external parties. Everybody where telling Hezbollah to disarm and they were truly cornered. I think that the kidnapping was also a reaction to the internal politics, maybe more than the Salafi hostility.

I think there may lie some truth in what Gambill deduces there, as well as what you state ecce, but i also think that the kidnapping of the soldiers was a serious mistake commited by HA due to plain miscalculations.
We have to remember that every single successfull act of armed hostility against the declared enemy, Israel, was so far a welcomed extra bonus added to the glorification stack of the party in the eyes of its lebanese base, as well as regionally. Many such successfull armed missions had earned them negotiating advantages in terms of hostage exchange.

 

[ecce homo]

ecce homo, the way i see it, the kidnapping was given the green light ecause the war was inevitable from the Israeli side. As you may remember, 1-2 months before the 12th of July, some missiles were launched from the south and nobody claimed responsibility for that aggression. Brinkmanship was written all over the blue line and HA's kidnapping was an operational advantage for two reasons: they had the element of surprise because they started what was supposed to be a "skirmish" on their own terms and in a chosen moment of readiness. The second reason is the bounty, HA initiated by taking hostages, thus insuring that the Israeli leadership would sooner or later negotiate for their release.

They may be several factors as you point out. During that period I focused a lot on the internal factor and the pressure on HA. At the outbreak of war I only saw the internal pressure as a major factor. I remember the missile but did not reflect over them as much as I did at Sfeir when declaring from the US that HA must disarm now.

It must really have been a mix of all of those factors that in the same time that pushed HA to act. According to some other analyses HA hade no choice but to act when they saw an opportunity they could not miss when they had an easy target. HA attempted several times before so it was no secret that they would try if they got the chance.

 

[4U2IMI8]

They may be several factors as you point out. During that period I focused a lot on the internal factor and the pressure on HA. At the outbreak of war I only saw the internal pressure as a major factor. I remember the missile but did not reflect over them as much as I did at Sfeir when declaring from the US that HA must disarm now.

It must really have been a mix of all of those factors that in the same time that pushed HA to act. According to some other analyses HA hade no choice but to act when they saw an opportunity they could not miss when they had an easy target. HA attempted several times before so it was no secret that they would try if they got the chance.

The target was an open operation with no time limits. The operators on the ground relayed the opportunity to central command that gave them the ok to go ahead with it. It was a target of opportunity, it was not planned for that specific moment, but for any moment the operation became feasible.

 

[fidelio]

They may be several factors as you point out. During that period I focused a lot on the internal factor and the pressure on HA. At the outbreak of war I only saw the internal pressure as a major factor. I remember the missile but did not reflect over them as much as I did at Sfeir when declaring from the US that HA must disarm now.

It must really have been a mix of all of those factors that in the same time that pushed HA to act. According to some other analyses HA hade no choice but to act when they saw an opportunity they could not miss when they had an easy target. HA attempted several times before so it was no secret that they would try if they got the chance.

Well, the internal reasons (if there are any) are epsilons in the calculated manner HA operates, the political aspect of the July war clearly defined in their strategy, they saw it coming miles away.
The timing of the abduction was first and foremost a tactical choice rather than a political one.
HA's mistake was not the act of abduction but rather their inability to predict the IDF's brutal retaliation.

 

[fidelio]

The target was an open operation with no time limits. The operators on the ground relayed the opportunity to central command that gave them the ok to go ahead with it. It was a target of opportunity, it was not planned for that specific moment, but for any moment the operation became feasible.

Yes, but the time frame did not stretch for months, HA knew the operation would be carried within 2-3 weeks of the green light. It was a perfect timing though. (IMHO).

 

[ecce homo]

I think there may lie some truth in what Gambill deduces there, as well as what you state ecce, but i also think that the kidnapping of the soldiers was a serious mistake commited by HA due to plain miscalculations.
We have to remember that every single successfull act of armed hostility against the declared enemy, Israel, was so far a welcomed extra bonus added to the glorification stack of the party in the eyes of its lebanese base, as well as regionally. Many such successfull armed missions had earned them negotiating advantages in terms of hostage exchange.

Miscalculation it was. I do not think that HA realized what the Israelis and the Bush administration had in mind if they would act against Israel. I think that HA was fully aware of the situation after the 1559 but not aware of the response to the action that it might take.

 

[4U2IMI8]

Yes, but the time frame did not stretch for months, HA knew the operation would be carried within 2-3 weeks of the green light. It was a perfect timing though. (IMHO).

There was no time constrain on that specific operation. Unlike others, that specific one was an open operation with a constant green light until executed. The only thing needed was an Ok from central command to execute.

 

[taifoon]

that's not a sociological espect. It ttakes more than money to convince Lebanese sunnis to take up arms. Why do you think poor sunnis are so eager to join these fundamentalists groups (spare me the brainwashing ****)

In that case you had better reformulate your riddle: What factors and parameters do you want to include in your sociological aspect? If not money which is a precondition for a better and happier, less frustrated life? A tool able to revoke general poverty and harsh social conditions?

I asked you: How come you have an excessive overflow of relatively wealthy saudi jihadis into Iraq and Lebanon, if mainly sociological aspects are important or to be more focused on than other pure wahhabi sectarian and ideological propelled motives?

warfare is based on deception. Do you honestly believe that a group of a few hundred salafist fighters can turn Lebanon into a islamic state? and if they wanted to, do you believe they will go at it so openly and so quickly???

It's ultimatly about the consequences of fanatism and not the counted figures of its followers. It took 10-20 people to cause the death of 4.000 people on 9/11. Our Fath el-Islam buddies had apparently advanced plans to detonate few sites, among them the Shekka tunnel. The worry is never about the goal, but the means to achieve that.

An islamic dawn will never break on Lebanon, neither for the shia nor the sunni, and the worry is not that you will suddenly wake up one day and find yourself enshrined inside a shadour or behind a hijab, but rather it is the fears which emanate from the thought of the route which some wackos think they can take you through to reach to that never coming day.

I'm not sure what you re talking about, but if you're talking about Lebanon, than this is not true. Most figures would point out that even in case of naturalization of all 400k pallies in Lebanon, Shiaa will still largely outnumber the sunnis in Lebanon.

Not true.

.

HA on the other hand have been working towards the Shia state. I still don't see why it's so hard to believe. They already have their own army, culture, education system, phone lines in parallel with the gov. They negociate with israel as HA not as Lebanon, and they go to war as HA. There are clear aspects of colonization of Beirut through purchase of land in predominantly no Shia areas (i am talking about Beirut because of personal experiance of HA members buying Land at 7 or 8 times its value to drive out Non Shias).

HA came into being when no Lebanese state existed, not a real one anyway. It continued to be, grow and flourish if you also wish, when a fake one under the syrian occupation, and Hariris supervision, was barely functioning. Something different than the past 20-25 years suddenly occured two years ago, and the full extent of the flaws we all have been involved in started to reemerge. Inno, what do you expect to happen with a lebanese community, shia, which was never looked after by the lebanese state before the civil war, managed to build and sustain itself under the war and evolved stronger than ever after all the wars were over? We came with a MoU, a deal on paper which is an attempt to gain this community back into the lebanese state entity. But wouldn't you think only fools would want to give up what they have today, which is much better than anything they got in the past from the lebanese state, in return for nothing?

Besides, the bit about the jewish state is outdone. Israel is much more comfortable with a shia state than a sunni islamic one. The fact that Iran and the West are "natural and cultural allies" is no joke. Remember that Israel's main beef is with the arabs not the muslims, and Shias are a lot less bound by their arab identity than sunnis.

Israel is at peace with Jordan and Egypt since ages. North african arab countries have been for many israeli prime ministers a chosen vacation resort.
The gulf countries with Saudi Arabia are done deal prostitutes to everything which smells diamonds and blood sefirs, western wisky and juicy business. Worry not, they have already copulated and they know each other very well.

peace and understanding with a lot of country love

 

[Synarchia]

In that case you had better reformulate your riddle: What factors and parameters do you want to include in your sociological aspect? If not money which is a precondition for a better and happier, less frustrated life? A tool able to revoke general poverty and harsh social conditions?

fear... imho, the number one reason why ppl will seek sunni fundamentalists protection.

I asked you: How come you have an excessive overflow of relatively wealthy saudi jihadis into Iraq and Lebanon, if mainly sociological aspects are important or to be more focused on than other pure wahhabi sectarian and ideological propelled motives?

there has been cases of non sunni financing fundamentalist sunni groups. ex is iran funding many Hamas military wings. so sectarian issue is not a main driver.

It's ultimatly about the consequences of fanatism and not the counted figures of its followers. It took 10-20 people to cause the death of 4.000 people on 9/11. Our Fath el-Islam buddies had apparently advanced plans to detonate few sites, among them the Shekka tunnel. The worry is never about the goal, but the means to achieve that.

you got the last part right, and no sunni group has the means to turn leb into an islamic state.

An islamic dawn will never break on Lebanon, neither for the shia nor the sunni, and the worry is not that you will suddenly wake up one day and find yourself enshrined inside a shadour or behind a hijab, but rather it is the fears which emanate from the thought of the route which some wackos think they can take you through to reach to that never coming day.

disagree. Demographics have no mercy. just look at the christians downfall from 60 years ago. or don't need to go that far, demographics shifts in Iraq in less tha 5 years. The case in lebanon is more delicate but it is happening. How many areas in Lebanon have turned from 10% christian or Sunni to 100% shia in a few years?
no one claims you will wake up one day forced to name your son Ali, but no need to be in denial about this cuz HA are half way over there already. i m not saying you should be scared cuz im pretty sure it will be done real smoth and spread out, but its gonna get there and there's no point fighting it.

Not true.

debatable in the lack of official figures, but non official figures tend to support this view.

HA came into being when no Lebanese state existed, not a real one anyway. It continued to be, grow and flourish if you also wish, when a fake one under the syrian occupation, and Hariris supervision, was barely functioning. Something different than the past 20-25 years suddenly occured two years ago, and the full extent of the flaws we all have been involved in started to reemerge. Inno, what do you expect to happen with a lebanese community, shia, which was never looked after by the lebanese state before the civil war, managed to build and sustain itself under the war and evolved stronger than ever after all the wars were over? We came with a MoU, a deal on paper which is an attempt to gain this community back into the lebanese state entity. But wouldn't you think only fools would want to give up what they have today, which is much better than anything they got in the past from the lebanese state, in return for nothing?

there's one thing i never did and will prolly never do is blame HA for what they did. What you listed here are poor justifications that don't change the fact that HA are well underway in their shia state plan. Sure, they were helped along the way by a poorly run system, but HA did have some part in this. After all, HA were offered so many deals to turn suthern lebanon into a prosperous paradise so that bid about HA being marginalised is a bit overplayed. You can argue as much as you want but you have to understand that there is absolutely nothing you can give HA that they can't take by themselves.

Israel is at peace with Jordan and Egypt since ages. North african arab countries have been for many israeli prime ministers a chosen vacation resort.
The gulf countries with Saudi Arabia are done deal prostitutes to everything which smells diamonds and blood sefirs, western wisky and juicy business. Worry not, they have already copulated and they know each other very well.

not sure what your poit is. That supports my argument that Israel will never allow a sunni fundamentalist country on its norder. a Shia state they can live with.

 

[4U2IMI8]

Miscalculation it was. I do not think that HA realized what the Israelis and the Bush administration had in mind if they would act against Israel. I think that HA was fully aware of the situation after the 1559 but not aware of the response to the action that it might take.

Since 1996, HA is in a state of readiness for a full pledged war by Israel every single moment. Their readiness level goes to the highest level after every operation they execute. The response to the operation was not expected by HA, they did not expect a full pledged war with such viciousness, but they were ready for it. The ones that were not ready were Israel and the US. They were not ready to be defeated in South Lebanon by whom they call terrorists but proved to be truly heroes to be bowed for.